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I count it as a great honor indeed that a scholar of George Thomas's
distinction has felt motivated to write the response that he has offered to my
lead article in this issue of the Ohio State Law Journal.I This honor has been
compounded by the singularly rewarding scholarly experience of revising my
article as Professor Thomas has drafted his response, accompanied by a
lively and friendly correspondence in which each of us has provoked and
enlightened the other's thinking about the issues involved. As he notes, we
have "worked together on the evidence, exchanging ideas and occasionally
causing each other to modify a position."2
Thomas, in 2001, published one of the most thoughtful articles in recent
years to touch upon whether the Fourteenth Amendment was understood
when it was proposed and ratified-and is properly understood today-to
nationalize or "incorporate" the Bill of Rights against the states.3 He was
kind enough in that article-which broadly rejected the incorporationist view
of the Amendment-to respectfully acknowledge the work of an essentially
unknown junior professor-me-supporting the incorporationist reading.4
Thomas today, in the most honorable scholarly tradition, has open-
mindedly reconsidered several significant aspects of his views expressed in
2001. He generously credits my lead article, for example, with
"demonstrat[ing] the skewed readings of [such earlier anti-incorporationists
as Charles] Fairman [and Raoul] Berger."5
* Associate Professor, Thomas Jefferson School of Law, San Diego; Social Science
Research Network (SSRN) Author Page, http://ssm.com/author= 181791. This Reply was
originally posted on SSRN in October 2007 and remains available for free download at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1019308 (for my other published scholarship, see the Author
Page cited above).
I See Bryan H. Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Revisiting the Original
Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866-67, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1509 (2007)
[hereinafter Wildenthal, Revisiting (2007)]; George C. Thomas 1II, The Riddle of the
Fourteenth Amendment: A Response to Professor Wildenthal, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1627
(2007) [hereinafter Thomas, Riddle (2007)].
2 Thomas, Riddle (2007), supra note 1, at 1631.
3 George C. Thomas III, When Constitutional Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the
Framers' Bill of Rights and Criminal Procedure, 100 MICH. L. REv. 145 (2001)
[hereinafter Thomas, When (2001)].
4See id. at 181 & n.131, 183 n.139, 191 n.176 (citing and discussing Bryan H.
Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise: Reassessing the Early Understanding in Court and
Congress on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment, 61 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1051 (2000) [hereinafter Wildenthal, Lost Compromise (2000)]); see generally
Thomas, When (2001), supra note 3, at 180-216 (rejecting the incorporation theory).
5 Thomas, Riddle (2007), supra note 1, at 1632. He thinks I may be too gentle with
William Winslow Crosskey, the notoriously opinionated pro-incorporationist scholar of
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Thomas argued in 2001, among other points: (1) that there was "absolute
silence" regarding the incorporation issue, on the part of "proponents and
opponents" of the Amendment, "during the ratification process" outside of
and after the congressional debates; 6 (2) thatthis allegedly complete silence
"severely undermines the argument that' the state legislatures intended to
ratify [an] Amendment that [totally] .inciporated the Bill of Rights"; 7 and
(3) that "the States only ceded .as 'much sovereignty to the federal
government in the ... Amendment as-. they, intended, to cede."'8 Given his
ultimate conclusions, this suggested that Thomas demanded what I refer to in
the lead article as "proof of specific; affirmative confirmation at the state
level"-perhaps in eyery single one of .the -required ratifying minimum of
three-fourths of the states-of the incorporationist reading. 9
But Thomas now agrees that we should not demand such a stringent level
of proof. He agrees with the "metric" proposed in the lead article "that allows
the question to be answered without direct evidence of the intent of the
ratifying legislatures." This metric asks "whether Congress 'clearly, publicly,
and candidly conveyed to the country' its intent to incorporate the Bill of
Rights."' 0 As Thomas now helpfully puts it, in terms with which I heartily
agree: "If we can be reasonably confident that congressional intent to
incorporate was part of the public discourse, implicitly or explicitly, then it
seems fair to read ratification as acquiescence in that intent."' As I put it:
"We need only require proof of fair public notice and legal ratification."' 12
Thomas also now seems to concede that the public discourse during the
ratification struggle' was not, in fact, as completely "silent" on incorporation
as he-and other scholars-have previously contended. He credits the lead
article with discussing "two neglected pieces of evidence from th[at] public
the 1950s-though we agree that "Crosskey present[ed] the evidence [on incorporation]
more objectively than Fairman and Berger." Id.; see also Wildenthal, Revisiting (2007),
supra note 1, at 1553 n.147.
6 Thomas, When (2001), supra note 3, at 208; see also id. at 204 (asserting that
"[t]he silence during the ratification debates about incorporating the criminal procedure
rights [of the Bill of Rights] was total").
7 Id. at 208.
8 Id. at 204; see also id. at 154-55.
9 Wildenthal, Revisiting (2007), supra note 1, at 1613; see also id. at 1601
(discussing Thomas's 2001 argument in this regard).
10 Thomas, Riddle (2007), supra note 1, at 1632-33 (quoting Wildenthal, Revisiting
(2007), supra note 1, at 1612); see also Thomas, Riddle (2007), supra note 1, at 1632
("agree[ing] ... one should not demand 'specific, affirmative confirmation at the state
level') (quoting Wildenthal, Revisiting (2007), supra note 1, at 1613).
'1 Thomas, Riddle (2007), supra note 1, at 1632.
12 Wildenthal, Revisiting (2007), supra note 1, at 1613.
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discourse"1 3: the essay by Kentucky jurist and commentator Samuel Smith
Nicholas 14 and the public letter widely distributed by Secretary of the Interior
Orville H. Browning. 15 Thomas himself very helpfully discussed the latter
evidence in his 2001 article, though he did not then note-as he now seems
to concede-that it may weigh: in .rfavor of the incorporationist
understanding. 16 I also -view the New ,York, Times editorial of May 25, 1866,
as an important and relatively neglected. piece of evidence bearing on the
relevant discourse-though. concededly only in an indirect and implicit
sense. 17 I would note that while- I highlight the foregoing pieces of evidence,
because they have not previouslybeen fully analyzed by scholars, they are
only examples of a broader array:of evidence bearing-either explicitly or
implicitly, directly or indirectly--on, the discourse outside Congress. Several
scholars have previously pointed .to significant additional evidence at least
suggesting that the incorporationist,,understanding in Congress may have
been widely shared out in the country during ratification.18
I credit Thomas with significantly influencing my own views on the
incorporation issue-both in his present response and in his 2001 article,
which continues to have great value. While he has not shaken my basic
confidence in the thesis set forth in the lead article, he has given me pause
and forced me to reconsider and rephrase many points. The final version of
my article contains countless changes-to its great benefit-prompted by his
thoughtful critiques.
We continue, however, to disagree on some basic issues. The lead article
contains replies at various appropriate points, mostly in footnotes, to
Thomas's arguments. This Reply sketches a few more.
Thomas concedes the importance of Representative Bingham and
Senator Howard.' 9 Yet he also suggests that their views on incorporation
may not have been broadly shared by other Republicans in Congress.20 I
disagree with any such broad suggestion, and with several specific aspects of
Thomas's discussion in this regard-though some of our differences may
13 Thomas, Riddle (2007), supra note 1, at 1632.
14 See Wildenthal, Revisiting (2007), supra note 1, at 1590-95; Thomas, Riddle
(2007), supra note 1, at 1647-49, 1656.
15 See Wildenthal, Revisiting (2007), supra note 1, at 1604-08.
16 Compare Thomas, When (2001), supra note 3, at 207-08, with Thomas, Riddle
(2007), supra note 1, at 1648-49, 1656.
17 See Wildenthal, Revisiting (2007), supra note 1, at 1576-78.
18 See id. at 1589 & n.262 (citing sources). Thomas acknowledges some of this
additional evidence. See Thomas, Riddle (2007), supra note 1, at 1647.
19 See Thomas, Riddle (2007), supra note 1, at 1639-42, 1646.
2 0 See id. at 1642-47.
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strike readers as minor quibbles.21 I certainly would not associate Thomas
with the unfortunate Bingham- and Howard-bashing of such scholars as
Fairman and Berger.22 Thomas's views are fair, thoughtful, and moderate,
even where I think he may be mistaken. For the most part, I am content to let
our accounts of Bingham, Howard, and the debates in Congress stand as they
are.
I am prompted to emphasize some disagreements I have with Thomas's
treatment of Senator Howard, the Senate debates, and the historical
understanding of "privileges" and "immunities" as discussed, most notably,
by Michael Kent Curtis. As I discuss in the lead article, Curtis-a scholar
whom both Thomas and I admire-has, in my view, though Thomas
disagrees, made a convincing case that "[t]he 'privileges' and 'immunities'
of American citizens were widely understood during [the Civil War era] to
include many, perhaps all, of the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights." 23
I think Thomas misses the extent to which Howard's crucial speech in
May 1866 corroborates Curtis's view. 24 Rather counterintuitively, Thomas
seems to view the Senate's reaction to Howard's speech as confirming
Thomas's own view that "'privileges or immunities' ... had little to do with
the first eight amendments." 25 Thomas notes that "Senate opponents of the
Fourteenth Amendment challenged the proponents to give a meaning of
privileges and immunities," and that "no proponent responded to the
challenge" by "expound[ing] Howard's theory of incorporation." 26 He notes
that Howard took the time, even on the hurried final day of debate, to
21 Compare, e.g., Wildenthal, Revisiting (2007), supra note 1, at 1540 n. 100
(discussing Rep. Hotchkiss), with Thomas, Riddle (2007), supra note 1, at 1645 (same),
and Wildenthal, Revisiting (2007), supra note 1, at 1547-48 & n.131 (discussing Rep.
Price), with Thomas, Riddle (2007), supra note 1, at 1643 (same, ultimately agreeing that
it is "fair to count Price in the incorporation camp," at least "for free speech"). I would
not quarrel too much with Thomas's discussion of the merits, or demerits, of Bingham's
Barron-contrarian views and their basis in Articles IV and VI. See id. at 1640-42. As
Thomas notes, "the plausibility of Bingham's theories ... does not matter." Id. at 1642.
The only relevant point is what such views tell us about the likely Republican
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment. I would reiterate that I think Bingham
actually understood Barron much better than most scholars have given him credit for-
especially as he meditated on the decision over time and honed his views in the crucible
of debate. His views on Article IV also seemed to evolve. See Wildenthal, Revisiting
(2007), supra note 1, at 1542 & n.1 11, 1552-56 & n.147, 1622-23 & n.374.
22 See Wildenthal, Revisiting (2007), supra note 1, at 1535-36, 1565-68.
23 Id. at 1562 & n. 176. But see Thomas, Riddle (2007), supra note 1, at 1633, 1635.
24 See Wildenthal, Revisiting (2007), supra note 1, at 1561-63.
25 Thomas, Riddle (2007), supra note 1, at 1635.
2 6 Id. at 1633 (first two quotations); id. at 1646 (third quotation); see also id at 1642
(conceding that "[ijt is difficult to be much clearer than" Howard was); id. at 1646
(referring to Howard's "crystal clear presentation").
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respond to a question about the meaning of "abridge" in Section 1. But
Thomas finds it curious that no Republican-neither Howard nor anyone
else-"took the bait" on privileges and immunities.27
As I discuss in the lead article, however, it is not surprising that
Republicans disdainfully ignored the claimed confusion of a few diehard
opponents about the meaning of a key clause that Howard had already
expounded at length-in a speech that seems to have expressed the
consensus views of the Republican supermaj ority.28 By contrast, Howard had
not previously given a lengthy speech explaining the meaning of "abridge." 29
If anything, the apparent lack of any felt need to recap Howard's speech
supports the conclusion that his understanding was widely shared. Thomas
says that "[a]lmost no effort was made to question, or explain, the meaning
of 'privileges or immunities.' 30 Indeed, that is true--aside from Howard's
speech. And it suggests that, at least with regard to the Bill of Rights
guarantees emphatically included by Howard, there was little genuine
concern or "confusion"--except, perhaps, from a few opponents looking to
make trouble-about what the phrase would, at a minimum, embrace.
Thomas finds this conclusion "too facile." 31 But it seems quite likely to me
that supporters of the Amendment shared Senator Poland's view-stated two
weeks after Howard's speech, and three days before the close of debate-that
it had been "so elaborately and ably discussed on former occasions" that
27 1d. at 1633.
28 See Wildenthal, Revisiting (2007), supra note 1, at 1586-87 & n.256; see also id.
at 1561-78 (discussing evidence that Howard spoke, and was understood to speak, on
behalf of the Joint Committee and the Republican caucus, when he formally introduced
the Amendment).
29 Howard's response on "abridge" is easily explained-Crosskey did so fifty-three
years ago-by the fact that Howard was challenged on a specific alleged inconsistency
on that point. Howard had suggested "abridge" was unclear as used in Section 2
regarding the right to vote--"which [Howard] pointed out was 'indivisible' and, so,
'incapable of abridgment."' William Winslow Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative
History," and the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 79
n.122 (1954) (quoting CG (39:1) 3039 (June 8, 1866)); see also Wildenthal, Revisiting
(2007), supra note 1, at 1511 n. 1 (noting my method of citing the Congressional Globe).
Howard responded, very briefly, that "it is easy to apply the term 'abridged' to the
privileges and immunities of citizens, which necessarily include within themselves a
great number of particulars." CG (39:1) 3039 (June 8, 1866). No comparable reason
existed for Howard to recap his discussion of the general scope of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause-as Thomas himself agrees at a later point in his response. See
Thomas, Riddle (2007), supra note 1, at 1646 (noting that "[i]t is understandable that
Howard did not wish to repeat his crystal clear presentation").
30 Thomas, Riddle (2007), supra note 1, at 1639.
31 Id. at 1646 (referring specifically to a similar argument by Crosskey).
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there was little point in continuing "to attempt to argue [it] at length and in
detail." 32
The most important disagreement Thomas and I have focuses on the
application to the available evidence of the metric on which we agree in
general principle-asking, essentially, whether the ratifying states were
placed on sufficiently fair notice about the incorporationist reading of the
Amendment. Thomas asserts that I "flinch" in applying this metric.33 He
argues that I ultimately rely instead on what he suggests are inappropriate
"presumptions" or "parlor tricks"-such as privileging congressional over
state ratification evidence and placing undue weight on a "plain text"
argument.34 1 take the jousting in good humor, as Thomas intends it. But I do
not think he has unhorsed me.
With regard to privileging the congressional evidence, the lead article
already offers a partial reply to Thomas's concern-and to a related criticism
offered by Kurt Lash. 35 Thomas concedes that my approach is at least
"defensible" to the extent it is contingent-as it is-on fair public notice of
Congress's understanding.36 The point of my textual analysis,37 likewise, is
not to claim that text alone can resolve the issue. It is that the text is fully
consistent with the incorporationist understanding strongly supported in
Congress-an understanding unrebutted, at worst, by the record outside
Congress, even assuming that record is "silent."
Our disagreement boils down to whether the evidence is, in fact,
sufficient to conclude that the states were placed on fair notice. Thomas asks
how I can "find fair notice from silence.-"a bridge too far" in his view.38
But my argument "proceed[s]" only arguendo-and only in part--"on the
32 CG (39:1) 2961 (June 5,. 1866), quoted in Wildenthal, Revisiting (2007), supra
note 1, at 1569.
33 Thomas, Riddle (2007), supra note 1, at 1634.
34 See id. at 1634, 1657.
35 See Wildenthal, Revisiting (2007), supra note 1, at 1613 n.342; see generally id. at
1609-15.
36 Thomas, Riddle (2007), supra note 1, at 1634. Contrary to Thomas's suggestion,
see id. at, I do not think my "version" of this argument differs substantially from those of
David Kyvig or Richard Aynes in this regard. If Aynes's version of the argument "makes
nonsense of the notion of sovereignty," id. then so does mine-though I do not think
either actually does. And if my version is "defensible," then so are those of Kyvig and
Aynes. Indeed, my version of the argument is actually, in at least one sense, somewhat
more extreme and generalized than that of Aynes. See Wildenthal, Revisiting (2007),
supra note 1, at 1610 n.333.
37 See Wildenthal, Revisiting (2007), supra note 1, at 1615-20.
38 Thomas, Riddle (2007), supra note 1, at 1634.
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stipulation that there was, essentially, silence out in the country on the
incorporation issue, during ratification. '39
I do not stipulate, even arguendo, that Congress or the newspapers
reporting on Congress were silent. In fact, as I have shown, they were far
from silent.40 It is primarily from Congress's very explicit, public, and
widely reported discussion of the issue that I discern a reasonable basis for
fair notice. Congress was, of course, composed of representatives of the
states-though not at that time, concededly, the Southern states recently in
rebellion, whose ratifications of the Amendment were also sought. But
everyone, in any event-including Southerners-could read about
Congress's understanding in the Globe and in prominent newspapers.
I agree, of course, that to the extent there was silence outside Congress,
such silence makes the argument for the incorporationist understanding
weaker than it otherwise would be. Leaving aside assumptions and
stipulations, I concede, in point of fact, that the evidence for incorporation
outside Congress "seems vague and scattered"-"[w]hat we mostly have is
silence-except for the congressional debates, the news coverage of them,
and some additional commentary outside Congress, such as the Nicholas
essay." 41 Thomas and I agree, in any event, that "it is for readers to weigh the
evidence." 42
But even if the silence outside Congress were complete, what I find "a
bridge too far" is the notion--evidently still embraced by Thomas-that
mere silence can negate and override a meaning publicly and explicitly
expressed in Congress and fully consistent with the text. As I argue in the
lead article, if the states--despite being so placed on fair notice of an
amendment's meaning-chose to go ahead and ratify it, then it should be
interpreted in light of Congress's understanding, despite any silence at the
state level. It should even be so construed despite "any contrary, possibly
self-serving views expressed at the state level"-no compelling examples of
which, however, have been shown in the case of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 43
Furthermore, as noted above, the record outside Congress during
ratification is not, in fact, completely silent on incorporation. The Nicholas
essay, for example, proves that at least one prominent state-level figure-and
not just on the East Coast, to answer another concern of Thomas44-
39 Wildenthal, Revisiting (2007), supra note 1, at 1609 (emphases added).
40 See generally id. at 1532-89.
41 Id. at 1600 (emphases added).
42 Thomas, Riddle (2007), supra note 1, at 1634; see also Wildenthal, Revisiting
(2007), supra note 1, at 1615.
43 See Wildenthal, Revisiting (2007), supra note 1, at 1614.
44 Cf Thomas, Riddle (2007), supra note 1, at 1634 & n.30; Wildenthal, Revisiting
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understood very clearly that Congress intended to nationalize the Bill of
Rights. The Browning letter, while not explicitly confirming that
understanding, proves that the most cogent objections to such a goal-those
most likely to have political traction-were, in fact, widely and energetically
raised against the Amendment. And, as noted above, that does not exhaust
the evidence outside Congress during ratification.
Finally, Thomas explores some fascinating post-ratification evidence
bearing on the meaning of the Amendment-especially the perennial puzzle
posed by the 1869 decision in Twitchell v. Pennsylvania.45 Thomas does not
respond to the relatively few bits of post-ratification evidence that I discuss
in the lead article-understandably, as they are beside the point of his main
argument.46 Likewise, I prefer to postpone to future articles--dealing in
depth with the 1867-73 period-a thorough response to the post-ratification
points that Thomas raises, including those on Twitchell.
For the time being, I generally stand by my discussion of Twitchell in my
2000 article, essentially endorsing Akhil Amar's analysis. 47 Twitchell's
lawyer raised not only a Sixth Amendment claim on behalf of his state death-
row client, but a generic due process claim as well-but only under the Fifth,
not the Fourteenth, Amendment. Thomas acknowledges that due process
claim, and Amar's argument, which I endorse, that Twitchell thus "proves
too much-and therefore nothing at all. ''48 But I do not think he fully comes
to grips with what it signifies. Twitchell's lawyer had no need to be familiar
with the incorporation theory to argue-and the Supreme Court had no such
need to hold-that Twitchell was entitled to invoke the Due Process Clause,
which the Fourteenth Amendment expressly imposed on the states. Yet
Twitchell's lawyer, however inexplicably or incompetently, did not invoke
the Fourteenth Amendment. And the Court, however hard-heartedly--or
perhaps because the Justices viewed Twitchell's claim as meritless in any
event-declined to deviate from strict procedural propriety by addressing a
claim, and an Amendment, not raised.
Thomas asks, with seeming incredulity, whether "[w]e are to believe that
the Court knew that the Sixth Amendment was now part of the Fourteenth
(2007), supra note 1, at 1594 n.273.
45 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 321 (1869). See Thomas, Riddle (2007), supra note 1, at 1649-
54; see also Wildenthal, Revisiting (2007), supra note 1, at 1527 n.57 (discussing how
post-ratification evidence should be weighed).
46 For my limited discussion of post-ratification materials, see, primarily,
Wildenthal, Revisiting (2007), supra note 1, at 1619, 1622-25.
4 7 See Wildenthal, Lost Compromise (2000), supra note 4, at 1083-84 & n.124
(citing, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101
YALE L.J. 1193 (1992)).
48 Amar (1992), supra note 47, at 1255, quoted in Wildenthal, Lost Compromise
(2000), supra note 4, at 1084; see also Thomas, Riddle (2007), supra note 1, at 1650.
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but refused to connect the dots for the lawyer who based his argument on the
wrong Due Process Clause." 49 But it is simply a fact that the Court did refuse
to connect the dots in that way, despite the inarguable language of the
Fourteenth Amendment. We may never know whether the Justices were
simply not thinking about the incorporation theory when they decided
Twitchell, or thought about it and consciously rejected it, or simply chose not
to raise it sua sponte. But that is all, in any event, utterly irrelevant to the true
puzzle of Twitchell. Speculating that the Justices were unaware of or rejected
the theory does nothing whatsoever to explain why the Justices chose not to
consider sua sponte the plainly applicable language of the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause.
Thomas argues that Chief Justice Chase, had he known of the
incorporation theory, would have eagerly engaged in "judicial activism" by
touting the theory sua sponte.50 But again, that misses the point. Forget about
the incorporation theory. What about the Fourteenth Amendment itself? We
know for a fact that Chase had no interest in even raising the Amendment
itself sua sponte-because he did not, even though it lay there in plain view.
If the inattention to the incorporation theory in Twitchell disproves the
prevalence or validity of that theory, one might as well argue that the
inattention to the Fourteenth Amendment in Twitchell disproves the existence
and recent ratification of that Amendment. It is in that sense that Twitchell-
or the anti-incorporationist argument based on Twitchell-"proves too
much."
My best guess, at this point, is that what we see in Twitchell is a busy
Court--distracted, as always, by a myriad of other cases and issues, and
disinclined to raise issues not pressed by the lawyer--disposing of a weak,
last-gasp claim by a death-row inmate. It is true, as Thomas points out, that
the Court granted oral argument before the full bench when it need not have
done so. 51 But that seems easily explained by the fact that it was a death-row
appeal. The Justices may have wanted to ensure that Twitchell and his lawyer
at least had every chance to raise any points that might have been missed in
the paper record. They provided that chance. It may be, in the unlikely event
that the incorporation theory actually would have made a difference for
Twitchell, that the lawyer blew that chance. But as I have said before, it does
not seem very convincing "to treat as an important refutation of incorporation
the Court's mere silence in a case where the Fourteenth Amendment itself
was not even raised and the underlying Bill of Rights claim that might have
been raised via the Fourteenth Amendment lacked substantial merit."
52
49 Thomas, Riddle (2007), supra note 1, at 1650-51.
50 See id. at 1651-52.
51 See id. at 1650-51.
52 Wildenthal, Lost Compromise (2000), supra note 4, at 1084 n. 124.
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But still, I agree with Thomas that Twitchell should make
incorporationists uneasy-it does me. It suggests a surprising lack of
attention to the incorporationist potential of the freshly ratified Amendment.
Thomas has presented some fascinating research and analysis, especially
regarding Twitchell's lawyer. In this, as in so many respects, Thomas has
made a valuable contribution to the ongoing scholarship on the "riddle" we
both seek to solve-the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment in relation to
the Bill of Rights. Let the debate continue-as I am sure it will.
